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Reward primingTheories of reinforcement learning have proposed that the association of reward to visual stimuli may
cause these objects to become fundamentally salient and thus attention-drawing. A number of recent
studies have investigated the oculomotor correlates of this reward-priming effect, but there is some
ambiguity in this literature regarding the involvement of top-down attentional set. Existing paradigms
tend to create a situation where participants are actively looking for a reward-associated stimulus before
subsequently showing that this selective bias sustains when it no longer has strategic purpose. This per-
severation of attentional set is potentially different in nature than the direct impact of reward proposed
by theory. Here we investigate the effect of reward on saccadic selection in a paradigm where strategic
attentional set is decoupled from the effect of reward. We ﬁnd that during search for a uniquely oriented
target, the receipt of reward following selection of a target characterized by an irrelevant unique color
causes subsequent stimuli characterized by this color to be preferentially selected. Importantly, this
occurs regardless of whether the color characterizes the target or distractor. Other analyses demonstrate
that only features associated with correct selection of the target prime the target representation, and that
the magnitude of this effect can be predicted by variability in saccadic indices of feedback processing.
These results add to a growing literature demonstrating that reward guides visual selection, often in spite
of our strategic efforts otherwise.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Humans and other animals tend to approach environmental ob-
jects that have proven beneﬁcial in prior experience and stay away
from objects that have not. This approach bias is thought to begin
as early as during sensation and perception, with neurochemical
signals of reward having a unique ability to induce low-level visual
plasticity that causes reward-associated stimuli to become salient
and attention-drawing (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Hickey, Chel-
azzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a; Roelfsema, van Ooyen, & Watanabe,
2010). Such a bias might have the evolutionary utility of increasing
the likelihood that we notice potentially-rewarding objects in our
environment.
A number of recent studies have investigated the oculomotor
correlates of this reward-priming of selection in humans. Most of
this work has relied on variations of a training paradigm estab-
lished in studies of covert, non-saccadic selection: participants ini-
tially learn an association between a stimulus and reward before
subsequently completing a test where (a) reward is no longerawarded, and (b) the formerly-reward-associated stimulus can ap-
pear as a nontarget (see Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a,
2011b). For example, Anderson and Yantis (2012) had participants
train in a visual search task where one of two target colors was
associated with a greater probability of high-magnitude reward.
At test participants searched for a uniquely-shaped target pre-
sented among distractors of varying color. Results showed that
the eyes were more likely to be misdirected into the visual hemi-
ﬁeld that contained a distractor characterized by the formerly-re-
ward-associated color. This occurred in spite of the fact that no
reward was awarded during test and participants knew that color
was no longer task relevant (see also Theeuwes & Belopolsky,
2012).
This kind of result is consistent with the idea that reward feed-
back has a low-level impact on visual representations, causing re-
ward-associated stimuli to become visually salient. However, it is
not clear whether the impact of reward identiﬁed in training stud-
ies necessarily reﬂects the direct, unique impact of reward on vi-
sion proposed by theory, or the inﬂuence of mediating cognitive
mechanisms like selective attention. For example, imagine that
during training participants become explicitly aware of the
relationship between stimuli features and reward outcome. This
would likely cause them to establish an endogenous attentional
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ual effects in visual search even when task conﬁnes change (e.g. Le-
ber, Kawahara, & Gabari, 2009; Tseng, Gobell, & Sperling, 2004),
and could possibly be of greater-than-normal strength, given that
it is repeatedly reinforced during training. Subsequent bias to-
wards reward-associated stimuli could reﬂect this attentional set
rather than any direct impact of reward on vision; this attentional
set happens to be motivated by the reward, but it is not a direct,
unique product of such. Similarly, even if participants are not
explicitly aware of the relationship between stimuli and outcome
they may very well have implicit knowledge of these statistical
regularities, and this kind of implicit knowledge of statistical regu-
larity is known to guide spatial attention (e.g. Chun, 2000; Chun &
Jiang, 1998; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). Results demon-
strating change in the processing of reward-predictive stimuli
when participants have no explicit awareness of this relationship
thus remain a potential product of the use of implicit knowledge
to prepare attentional set (e.g. Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Dri-
ver, 2010).
In an effort to control for this problem of interpretation some
studies of covert visual search have employed paradigms that do
not tie reward to speciﬁc stimuli features. For example, in Hickey,
Chelazzi, and Theeuwes (2010a) participants were randomly re-
warded for correctly completing a visual search task involving
selection of a shape singleton. This target was presented among a
number of distractors, most of them identical to one another and
of the same color as the target, but one of them singled out by un-
ique color. This color singleton distractor was red while all other
stimuli were green or vice versa, and this changed randomly from
trial to trial. The colors deﬁning the target and distractor could thus
be the same as in the previous trial or could swap.
This design has two critical features: ﬁrst, because search was
always for the unique shape, color was entirely task-irrelevant.
Second, though participants were paid based on the reward feed-
back provided on a trial-by-trial basis, reward was actually random
and participants were equally likely to receive high-magnitude or
low-magnitude reward after any correctly completed trial. As such,
there was no opportunity for participants to explicitly or implicitly
learn about a relationship between stimuli and reward. In spite of
this, behavioral and event-related-potential results show that par-
ticipants were more likely to attend to the distractor when it had
the color that had characterized the high-reward target in the
immediately preceding trial (see also Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b, 2011). This pattern
sustained even when the experimental paradigm was modiﬁed
such that high-magnitude reward on one trial was predictive of a
change in target color in the next, making it strategically coun-
ter-productive to search for the reward-associated stimulus (Hick-
ey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a, E1).
We have recently demonstrated that this non-strategic effect of
reward can be indexed in eye movements, and particularly in sacc-
adic curvature (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012). Participants in this
study moved their eyes from a central ﬁxation point to a red or
green target that could be located at the top or bottom of the dis-
play. In every trial a distractor appeared to the left or right of the
straight-line path to the target; this distractor could be red, with
the target green, or vice versa. Stimuli colors were randomly deter-
mined for each trial, but the target was always deﬁned by its posi-
tion and color was task irrelevant. Participants randomly received
high- or low-magnitude reward feedback after each trial and we
analyzed results as a function of (a) whether the trial immediately
preceding the current trial had garnered high or low reward, and
(b) whether the colors had stayed the same between trials or
swapped. Results showed that during fast target-directed eye
movements, saccades deviated toward the distractor when high-
magnitude reward had been received and the colors had swapped(such that the distractor acquired the color of the target from the
preceding trial). In contrast, slow target-directed eye movements
deviated further away. Reward thus appeared to increase distrac-
tor salience, eventually resulting in stronger distractor suppres-
sion, and this occurred under circumstances where there was no
statistical regularity in the relationship between stimuli and re-
ward that could be leveraged to create attentional set.
The paradigm adopted in Hickey and van Zoest (2012) was not
explicitly designed to induce saccadic capture to the distractor
location. However, analysis did reveal a reliable difference in cap-
ture rates: when the distractor was characterized by a reward-
associated color participants were slightly more likely to misallo-
cate their eyes to its location (3.6% vs. 2.5% of total trials). Here
we further investigate the nature of this non-strategic, reward-
elicited oculomotor capture effect. In order to elicit higher rates
of capture in the current study we adapted an experimental para-
digm extensively employed in existing studies of oculomotor cap-
ture (e.g. van Zoest & Donk, 2005; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes,
2004). Participants searched for a uniquely-oriented horizontal
line element presented in a large array of non-targets. Most of
these nontargets were homogeneous but one differed from the
others in orientation, rendering it a singleton distractor (see
Fig. 1). We manipulated two critical parameters from trial to trial.
First, in each trial either the target or distractor was uniquely red in
color. Importantly, the red color was task irrelevant: it randomly
characterized either the target or distractor in each trial with equal
probability. Second, participants received either high-magnitude
or low-magnitude reward after saccadic selection of the target.
Participants were instructed to maximize reward and were paid
based on the value accumulated throughout the experiment, but
reward magnitude was actually randomly determined for each cor-
rectly-performed trial.
We approached this design with the idea that receipt of reward
after saccadic selection of the salient target would cause the rein-
forcement of the target representation, rendering subsequent stim-
uli with the same unique color visually salient. As such, when
successful selection of a red target resulted in reward, target selec-
tion in the next trial should be facilitated when the target is again
characterized by red color. In contrast, if the red color comes to
characterize the distractor this should increase the likelihood that
the eyes will be misallocated to this stimulus.
In addition to this central hypothesis, we approached the data
with a further question regarding the role of the quality of target
selection in reward-priming. Given that we measure overt saccadic
behavior we can analyze the current trial as a function of whether
oculomotor capture occurred in the preceding trial. This allows us
to answer a question that cannot be addressed in studies of covert
selection: when participants select the distractor, causing the need
for reorientation of the eyes to the target, does subsequent reward
have an impact on target and distractor representations? Is re-
ward-priming contingent on efﬁcient target selection?
Finally, we were interested in the degree to which saccadic indi-
ces of the depth of feedback processing could predict subsequent
eye movement behavior. Do subjects who spend more time pro-
cessing feedback – who show longer saccadic dwell times on the
target and feedback stimuli at the end of a trial – show subsequent
differences in saccadic selection?2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Seventeen observers ranged in age from 19 to 26 (average 23.6).
All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Fig. 1. General paradigm; correct target selection was awarded with 10 or 1 points (A). An example of the actual search display. The target was the unique horizontal line
element. Target and distractor are magniﬁed for the purposes of illustration (B).
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All subjects were tested in a sound-attenuated, dimly-lit room
with their heads resting on a chinrest. The monitor was located
at eye level 75 cm from the chinrest. A Pentium IV computer with
a processor speed of 2.3 GHz controlled the timing of the events.
Displays were presented on an Iiyama 2100 SVGA monitor with a
resolution of 1024  768 pixels and a 100-Hz refresh rate. Eye
movements were recorded via an Eyelink II tracker (SR Research
Ltd., Canada) with 500 Hz temporal resolution and a 0.2 of visual
angle spatial resolution. The system uses an infrared video-based
tracking technology to compute the pupil center and pupil size of
both eyes.2.3. Stimuli
The stimulus display consisted of multiple vertical line seg-
ments presented in a 17  17 square matrix with a raster width
of 17.4  17.4 of visual angle (see Fig. 1). Each line element had
an approximate length of 0.76 and width of 0.15. The vast major-
ity of elements were identical vertical white lines (RGB 200, 200,
200), but two unique singletons were present in each trial. One
of these – the target – was a horizontal line. The other – the salient
orientation distractor – was oriented either 45 to the left or 45 to
the right. The two singletons could be presented at one of the six
pre-deﬁned locations in the display of equal retinal eccentricity
(5.3 visual angle) with the sole conﬁne that the target and salient
distractor were always presented at opposite locations. In each
trial either the target or distractor had unsaturated red color
(RGB 200, 100, 100). Thus, in any given trial, either the target or
the distractor was a red color singleton. All elements were pre-
sented on a gray background.
Reward feedback was provided to observers for 2500 ms
immediately after successful selection of the horizontal target.
Importantly, reward was provided regardless of whether the tar-
get or distractor was initially selected, so long as the eyes reached
the target within 600 ms of saccadic onset. This meant that re-
ward could be received in trials where the eyes were ﬁrst de-ployed to the distractor before being redeployed to the target.
Feedback was presented in gray font (times new roman, 46.5
font; 1.5 visual angle height) at the target location and was
either ‘‘+10’’, denoting the receipt of 10 points or ‘‘+1’’, denoting
the receipt of 1 point. The visual search display remained onsc-
reen during the presentation of the feedback. Trials in which
the saccadic onset latency was shorter than 80 ms (anticipation
errors), longer than 600 ms, or in which neither the target or dis-
tractor were ﬁxated within the available time-period were con-
sidered errors. In these trials the display was removed from the
screen and ‘‘10’’ was presented at the center of the screen for
600 ms, denoting the loss of 10 points.
2.4. Procedure and design
Each block started with a nine-point grid calibration procedure.
At the initiation of each trial drift-correction was performed such
that center was established as the point of ﬁxation. Participants
initiated each trial by pressing the space bar, following which a ﬁx-
ation point was presented for a random duration of 300–600 ms
before onset of the search display.
The experiment consisted of a practice session of 32 trials and
an experimental session of 576 trials. The experimental session
was divided into three blocks of 192 trials. Each observer contrib-
uted 144 trials in each of the 4 conditions resulting from the facto-
rial combination of prior reward (high- vs. low-magnitude reward)
and color singleton identity (target red vs. distractor red). Feedback
regarding average saccadic latency and the total amount of reward
collected in points and euros was provided after every 32 trials.
Each point awarded during participation had a value of 0.285 euro
cents, and on average participants received 8 euros for participa-
tion. Participants were instructed to initiate saccades quickly upon
the appearance of the search display.
2.5. Data analysis
Default settings on the eye tracker were adopted for the detec-
tion of saccades: an eye movement was considered a saccade when
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and end points were deﬁned as the point when velocity fell below
this threshold. Saccade latency was deﬁned as the interval between
the presentation of the saccade target and the initiation of a sacc-
adic eye movement. If the eyes were not within 3 of the ﬁxation
point when the saccade was elicited the saccade was classiﬁed as
an error and not further analyzed. The initial saccade was charac-
terized as target or distractor directed if the endpoint was within
3 of the target or distractor position. Initial saccades that missed
either the location of the target or the distractor counted as errors
and were not analyzed further.3. Results
Data from two participants were removed because performance
was almost entirely determined by stimuli color (suggesting a mis-
understanding of task instructions). In one case the participant was
91.5% likely to initially move the eyes to a red target but only 14.2%
likely to select a white target. The other was 96.1% likely to select a
white target but only 32.6% likely to select a red target. The color
bias in these subjects was substantially larger than that observed
in the remaining subjects (where the eyes were directed to a white
and red target with 69.2% [15.7% SD] and 62.4% [13.9% SD] accu-
racy, respectively).
In the remaining 15 participants 0.11% of trials were discarded
because saccade onset latency was shorter than 80 ms and 0.76% of
trials were discarded because it was longer than 600 ms. A further
3.07% of trials were discarded because of inaccurate ﬁxation at dis-
play onset and 6.91% were discarded because the saccade in either
the current or preceding trial had landed on neither target nor
distractor.
In 66% of remaining trials the initial saccade was correctly di-
rected towards the horizontal target. Mean saccadic reaction time
(SRT) in these trials was 240 ms. In the other 34% of these trials the
initial saccade was to the distractor and mean SRT was 220 ms.
This difference in SRT was signiﬁcant, t(14) = 4.30, p < 0.001.
In our primary analysis the proportion of trials where the ﬁrst
eye movement was directed to the target was computed for each
subject as a function of four factors: the identity of the stimulus
initially selected in the preceding trial (prior selection: target vs.
distractor), the color of the stimulus selected in the preceding trial
(prior selection color: red vs. white), reward magnitude in the pre-
vious trial (prior reward: high vs. low), and whether the red color
continued to characterize the same stimulus in the current trial
as was the case in the preceding trial (color identity change: change
vs. no change). These results are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Statistical analysis began with a repeated measures analysis of
variance (RANOVA) based on the results illustrated in Fig. 2 with
the factors described above. This revealed a critical four-way inter-
action, F(1,14) = 8.39, p = 0.012, which is further examined in fol-
low-up tests below. A marginally signiﬁcant three-way
interaction between prior selection, prior selection color, and color
identity change was also detected, F(1,14) = 4.560, p = 0.051,
reﬂecting increased likelihood of the misallocation of the eyes to
the distractor when (a) the target acquires red color immediately
after a trial where the eyes were misallocated to a red distractor
(Fig. 2B), and (b) the target acquires red color after a trial where
the eyes were correctly allocated to a white target (Fig. 2C). This
pattern describes a difﬁculty in selecting the target when the target
has the salient color that has recently characterized a to-be-ig-
nored distractor, regardless of prior reward outcome. An additional
main effect of color identity change was detected, F(1,14) = 68.88,
p < 0.001, reﬂecting increased likelihood that the eyes would be di-
rectly deployed to the target when the red color characterized the
same stimulus in the current trial as it had in the preceding trial(72% vs. 59%), alongside a marginally signiﬁcant main effect of prior
reward, F(1,14) = 4.36, p = 0.056, reﬂecting better performance fol-
lowing high reward (67% vs. 64%).
To gain further perspective on the critical four-way interaction
we conducted follow-up RANOVAs limited to trials where selection
in the preceding trial had been of either the red or white stimulus
(i.e. with prior selection color held static). When the red stimulus
was selected in the previous trial a signiﬁcant three-way interac-
tion between prior selection, prior reward, and color identity change
was observed, F(1,14) = 5.51, p = 0.034. This effect is visually
apparent in the difference in results between Fig. 2A and B: there
appears to be an interaction between the color identity change
and prior reward factors in Fig. 2A that is absent in Fig. 2B. No cor-
responding three-way interaction was observed when the white
stimulus was selected in the preceding trial (cf. Fig. 2C and D),
F(1,14) = 1.17, p = 0.298.
To parse this three-way interaction, a subsequent RANOVA with
factors for change and prior reward was conducted based on results
observed when the eyes had been efﬁciently deployed to a red tar-
get in the preceding trial (Fig. 2A). This revealed a reliable two-way
interaction, F(1,14) = 6.95, p = 0.019. No interaction was observed
when analysis was limited to trials where it was the red distractor
that had been selected in the preceding trial (Fig. 2B),
F(1,14) = 1.17, p = 0.30.
Analysis of accuracy results thus revealed that the eyes were
more often deployed to a red stimulus, regardless of task relevance,
following trials where selection of a red target garnered reward. To
determine if saccadic response time in any way played a role in
creating this pattern we conducted an additional omnibus RANO-
VA of saccadic response times with the same factors that were ap-
plied to the proportional results. This revealed only one signiﬁcant
effect: a three-way interaction between prior selection, prior selec-
tion color, and color identity change, F(1,14) = 8.36, p = 0.012. This
interaction is driven by a speeded response when participants mis-
allocated the eyes to a white distractor in the previous trial, caus-
ing the need for a corrective redeployment of attention to the red
target, and the target in the current trial is red. This may reﬂect the
establishment of cognitive control following a rather severe sacc-
adic error: having misallocated the eyes to a relatively low-salience
distractor, participants established strong set for the target and
this beneﬁts performance in the next trial when the target matches
this set. In any case, this effect was not reliably sensitive to reward
feedback, as reﬂected in a non-signiﬁcant four-way interaction
(F < 1). The accuracy results described above were thus not reliably
sensitive to the speed of saccadic response.
Finally, we analyzed results from the critical condition illus-
trated in Fig. 2A as a function of the time that the eyes ﬁxated on
feedback in the preceding trial. Because the trial eventually ended
there was an upper limit on the total time that the eyes could re-
main on the feedback. However, participants tended to break ﬁxa-
tion early in order to return the eyes to the center of the screen,
resulting in substantial between-subject variability in the total
time that the eyes remained on the feedback. We calculated the
average time that the eyes remained on feedback for each subject
separately as a function of the magnitude of the feedback, and sub-
sequently calculated a difference score by subtracting the time
spent on low-magnitude reward from the time spent on high-mag-
nitude reward. These values are plotted on the x-axis in Fig. 3A and
B.
In a separate procedure we calculated for each of the reward
conditions the difference in proportion-to-target results as a func-
tion of whether the identity of the red colored stimulus had chan-
ged between trials. This corresponds to a subtraction between the
square and circle markers in Fig. 2A for each reward condition
separately, and garners a numeric index of the impact of low-
magnitude and high-magnitude reward on the strength of the
Fig. 2. The impact of prior reward and color swap on oculomotor performance when in the previous trial the target was correctly selected (panels A and C on the left) and
when in the previous trials the distractor was initially selected (panels B and D on the right), and when prior selection color was red (upper panels A and B) and when the prior
selection color was white (bottom panels C and D). The critical result is illustrated in panel (A). Error bars reﬂect within-subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005). (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 3. Relationship between time spent on reward feedback in trial N  1 and the proportion of eye movements directed to the target in trial n, where (A) high magnitude
reward was received in trial N  1, and (B) low magnitude reward was received in trial N  1. Broken lines reﬂect least-square ﬁt of the data.
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correlated with the dwell time measure, garnering the results illus-
trated in Fig. 3. A strong relationship was identiﬁed when feedback
had indicated high-magnitude reward, indicating that those who
spent less time on the high-magnitude reward feedback subse-
quently showed a larger impact of reward on oculomotor selection
(Pearson r: 0.493, p = 0.031; Fig. 3A). No corresponding relation-
ship was revealed when feedback had indicated low-magnitude re-
ward (Pearson r: 0.217, p = 0.220; Fig. 3B). The difference between
these correlations was signiﬁcant, t(12) = 10.1, p < 0.001 (Chen &
Popovich, 2002; Stieger, 1980).4. Discussion
The central ﬁnding is illustrated in Fig. 2A: high-magnitude re-
ward reinforced the representation of the target such that the
eyes were preferentially deployed to this object in the next trial.
This increased the likelihood that the eyes would be correctly de-
ployed to the target when it was this stimulus that had carried
the unique color, but it also increased the likelihood that the dis-
tractor would be selected when the unique color characterized
this nontarget.
In contrast to prior investigations of reward and oculomotor
capture (e.g. Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Theeuwes & Belopolsky,
2012) the reward-priming effect on saccadic capture observed here
is very unlikely to be strategic or top-down in nature, or rely in any
way on the implicit recognition of statistical regularities in the re-
ward schedule. Our design was such that the unique color ran-
domly characterized either the target or distractor in each trial.
Participants knew that stimulus color was task-irrelevant and that
the speciﬁc visual characteristics of the display did not predict re-
ward magnitude. There was thus no explicit or implicit motivation
for them to establish a top-down attentional set based on color. In
contrast, there was strong motivation for them to establish a set for
the speciﬁc horizontal orientation of the target, which never chan-
ged. The capture of the eyes indexed here, and its modulation by
reward, is in spite of this top-down set.
Selective bias for the reinforced color was observed only when
the target selected in trial n  1 had unique, high-salience red color
(cf. Fig. 2A and C). Rewarded selection of a white target, whichshared color with all 287 background stimuli, had a nominal ben-
eﬁt on subsequent selection of a target characterized by the same
color (Fig. 2C, no color change condition), but did not cause a white
distractor to draw attention or interfere in search for the target in
the next trial (Fig. 2C, color change condition). This makes sense:
reward-priming of a color shared with many non-target items
would not cause a dramatic increase in the relative salience of
the white orientation-singleton distractor.
One of the motivations for the current study was the idea that
reinforcement of target selection would have a qualitatively differ-
ent impact when selection had been efﬁcient and the eyes had
been directly deployed to the target, as compared to when selec-
tion had been inefﬁcient and the eyes had ﬁrst been captured to
the distractor. The results do in fact show a very different pattern
between these conditions: when participants directly selected the
target, reward primed the unique target color such that subsequent
stimuli with that color became salient (Fig. 2A). This pattern was
entirely absent when the eyes had been initially captured in the
preceding trial (Fig. 2B). Thus, only unique features associated with
correct selection of the target resulted in a subsequent reward-
priming effect; features associated with incorrect selection of the
distractor did not modulate performance.
We additionally approached the data with an interest in how
variability in the processing of reward feedback might predict
subsequent behavior. Existing work has shown that the quality
of feedback processing – as indexed in an electrophysiological
signature of activity in the anterior cingulate cortex – can predict
the magnitude of subsequent behavioral reward-priming (Hickey,
Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). Those results demonstrated a posi-
tive relationship that was driven by variability in the response to
high-magnitude reward feedback. Here we observe a negative
relationship: participants whose eyes remained on the high-mag-
nitude reward feedback were less likely to misallocate their eyes
to a distractor when it came to be characterized by the reward-
associated red color in the next trial (see Fig. 3A). Those who
show less evidence of differential processing of reward feedback
show the greatest effect of reward magnitude on subsequent
behavior.
We speculatively interpret this surprising pattern as evidence of
individual variability in the experience of reward. We have sug-
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ence to irrelevant features like color is an automatic, low-level
phenomenon that has evolutionary origins (e.g. Hickey, Chelazzi,
& Theeuwes, 2010a; Hickey & van Zoest, 2012). Results suggest
that such reward-priming can be insensitive to strategic control,
in that reward-associated colors remain salient even when partic-
ipants know that stimuli characterized by these colors are very un-
likely to be task relevant (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a).
However, the automaticity of this effect is not contingent on the
simple presentation of reward feedback: the feedback has to acti-
vate the neural reward system to be effective. In other words, there
must be an experience of reward for there to be a subsequent effect
on vision. Our feeling is that observed variance in reward priming
often reﬂects underlying variance in the strength and quality of
this experience of reward, and this idea has found support in re-
sults showing that the strength of direct priming can be predicted
by a personality questionnaire designed to judge reward sensitivity
(Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b) and by a measure of reward
processing in cortex (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). In the
current results, it appears that those who dwell on the feedback
longer may have a different, potentially ‘colder’ experience of the
reward.
During the editorial process a reviewer suggested that the indi-
vidual variability observed here might be related in nature to
known differences in reward’s effect on vision resulting from var-
iability in working memory capacity (see Anderson, Laurent, &
Yantis, 2011a, 2011b). It seems to us that this would be a graceful
and compelling account if our design had relied on statistical reg-
ularities between stimulus and outcome. Under these circum-
stances, we might infer that the observed individual differences
reﬂected variance in the ability to store and access these ‘rules’.
However, given that reward was random in our design, and there
were no such rules, the task does not strike us as one that taxes
working memory, and our feeling is that variability in reward sen-
sitivity is a likelier causative agent.
The individual variability in human behavior that we observe in
the current data may have a parallel in the animal approach behav-
ior literature. There, between-animal variability in behavior during
and after Pavlovian learning is well documented: some animals
that have learned to associate a conditioned stimulus (such as a
light) to an unconditioned stimulus (such as the delivery of food)
will approach and interact the conditioned stimulus when it is acti-
vated (‘sign-trackers’), whereas others will approach and wait at
the location where the unconditioned stimulus will be appear
(‘goal-trackers’; e.g. Robinson & Flagel, 2009). Though the associa-
tion between unconditioned and conditioned stimuli in this work
is consistent (unlike the random reward schedule employed in
the current study) the behavior of sign-trackers does appear auto-
matic and non-strategic in nature: the animals know that food will
never appear at the location of the conditioned stimulus, and mov-
ing to this location is counter-strategic in that it delays actual food
consumption. This propensity to approach the conditioned stimu-
lus in spite of the cost has been related to stronger attribution of
incentive salience to the conditioned stimulus apparatus and loca-
tion. The conditioned stimulus appears to become motivationally
salient for sign-trackers, subsequently causing it to act as a better
conditioned reinforcer (Robinson & Flagel, 2009) and to more efﬁ-
ciently reinstate reward-seeking behavior following extinction
(Yager & Robinson, 2010). No corresponding effects are observed
in goal-trackers. Such a misattribution of motivational salience
may underlie the non-strategic reward priming effect identiﬁed
in the current study.5. Conclusions
We demonstrate that the experience of reward can prime the
representation of task irrelevant features – in this case unique col-
or – causing objects with these features to be preferentially se-
lected by the eyes. This does not appear to be a strategic effect,
but it does appear to be sensitive to the quality of target selection:
when target selection was inefﬁcient, and the eyes had ﬁrst been
captured to a distractor, reward caused no subsequent priming of
the distractor color. We further show that there is substantial indi-
vidual variability in the reward-priming of saccadic selection that
may have interesting parallels in animal approach behavior.Acknowledgments
Our thanks to Marlou Kooiker and Onno van der Groen for data
collection. C.H. is supported by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientiﬁc Research (NWO) VENI Grant 016-125-283.References
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2012). Value-driven attentional and oculomotor
capture during goal-directed, unconstrained viewing. Attention, Perception, &
Psychophysics.
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011a). Learned value magniﬁes
salience-based attentional capture. PLoS ONE, 6(11).
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011b). Value-driven attentional capture.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
108(25), 10367–10371.
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (1998). What is the role of dopamine in reward:
Hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience? Brain Research Reviews,
28(3), 309–369.
Chen, P. Y., & Popovich, P. M. (2002). Correlation: Parametric and nonparametric
measures. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Chun, M. M. (2000). Contextual cueing of visual attention. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 4(5), 170–178.
Chun, M. M., & Jiang, Y. (1998). Contextual cueing: Implicit learning and memory of
visual context guides spatial attention. Cognitive Psychology, 36(1), 28–71.
Cousineau, D. (2005). Conﬁdence intervals in within-subject designs: A simpler
solution to Loftus and Masson’s method. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for
Psychology, 1(1), 4–45.
Della Libera, C., & Chelazzi, L. (2009). Learning to attend and to ignore is a matter of
gains and losses. Psychological Science, 20(6), 778–784.
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L., & Theeuwes, J. (2010a). Reward changes salience in human
vision via the anterior cingulate. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(33), 11096–11103.
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L., & Theeuwes, J. (2010b). Reward guides vision when it’s your
thing: Trait reward-seeking in reward-mediated visual priming. PLoS ONE,
5(11), e14087.
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L., & Theeuwes, J. (2011). Reward has a residual impact on
target selection in visual search, but not on the suppression of distractors. Visual
Cognition, 19(1), 117–128.
Hickey, C., & van Zoest, W. (2012). Reward creates oculomotor salience. Current
Biology, 22(7), R219–220.
Kristjánsson, Á., Sigurjónsdóttir, Ó., & Driver, J. (2010). Fortune and reversals of
fortune in visual search: Reward contingencies for pop-out targets affect search
efﬁciency and target repetition effects. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics,
72(5), 1229–1236.
Leber, A. B., Kawahara, J., & Gabari, Y. (2009). Long-term abstract learning of
attentional set. Journal of Experimental Psychology – Human Perception and
Performance, 35(5), 1385–1397.
Robinson, T. E., & Flagel, S. B. (2009). Dissociating the predictive and incentive
motivational properties of reward-related cues through the study of individual
differences. Biological Psychiatry, 65, 869–873.
Roelfsema, P., van Ooyen, A., & Watanabe, T. (2010). Perceptual learning rules based
on reinforcers and attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(2), 64–71.
Stieger, J. H. (1980). Tests for comparing elements of a correlation matrix.
Psychological Bulletin, 87, 245–251.
Theeuwes, J., & Belopolsky, A. V. (2012). Reward grabs the eye: Oculomotor capture
by rewarding stimuli. Vision Research, 74, 80–85.
Tseng, C.-H., Gobell, J. L., & Sperling, G. (2004). Long-lasting sensitization to a given
colour after visual search. Nature, 428, 657–660.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Jungé, J. A., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). The automaticity of visual
statistical learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology – General, 134(4),
552–564.
74 C. Hickey, W. van Zoest / Vision Research 92 (2013) 67–74van Zoest, W., & Donk, M. (2005). The effects of salience on saccadic target selection.
Visual Cognition, 2(2), 353–375.
van Zoest, W., Donk, M., & Theeuwes, J. (2004). The role of stimulus-driven and goal-
driven control in saccadic visual selection. Journal of Experimental Psychology –
Human Perception and Performance, 30(4), 746–759.Yager, L. M., & Robinson, T. E. (2010). Cue-induced reinstatement of food seeking in
rats that differ in their propensity to attribute incentive salience to food cues.
Behavioural Brain Research, 214(1), 30–34.
